Non Cooperative Game Theoretic Approach for Residential Energy
  Management in Smart Grid by Naidji, Ilyes et al.
NON COOPERATIVE GAME THEORETIC APPROACH FOR RESIDENTIAL
ENERGY MANAGEMENT IN SMART GRID
Ilyes Naidji
Faculty of Mathematical, Physical and Natural Sciences,
University of Tunis-El Manar, Tunisia.
Email: ilyes.naidji@fst.utm.tn
Moncef Ben Smida
LSA Lab, Tunisia Polytechnic School,
University of Carthage, Tunisia.
Email: moncef.bensmida@gmail.com
Mohamed Khalgui
National Institute of Applied Sciences and Technology,
University of Carthage, Tunisia.
Email: khalgui.mohamed@gmail.com
Abdelmalik Bachir
LESIA Lab, Computer Science Department,
Biskra University, Algeria.
Email: a.bachir@univ-biskra.dz
KEYWORDS
Energy management, Demand response, Discomfort
level, Game theory, NSGA-II
ABSTRACT
Demand side management (DSM) is one of the main
functionalities of the smart grid as it allows the con-
sumer to adjust its energy consumption for an efficient
energy management. Most of the existing DSM tech-
niques aim at minimizing the energy cost while not con-
sidering the comfort of consumers. Therefore, maintain-
ing a trade-off between these two conflicting objectives
is still a challenging task. This paper proposes a novel
DSM approach for residential consumers based on a non-
cooperative game theoretic approach, where each player
is encouraged to reshape its electricity consumption pat-
tern through the dynamic pricing policy applied by the
smart grid operator. The players are guided to select
the best strategy that consists of scheduling their elec-
tric appliances in order to minimize the daily energy
cost and their discomfort level. The Nash Equilibrium
of the energy management game is achieved using Non-
Sorting Genetic Algorithm NSGA-II. Simulation results
show the effectiveness of the distributed non cooperative
game approach for the residential energy management
problem where an appreciable energy cost reduction is
reached while maintaining the discomfort in an accept-
able level.
INTRODUCTION
Along with the current transition of the power system
from a centralized to a distributed architecture (Mos-
bahi and Khalgui 2016), a great attention is being paid
to the power grid’s capacity to maintain the balance be-
tween demand and supply (Meskina et al. 2017, Abidi
et al. 2017). Indeed, the increasing penetration of dis-
tributed renewable energy sources (RES) which have an
intermittent nature induces new challenges for the smart
grid in terms of energy management, congestion, volt-
age and frequency variations, etc. In order to overcome
these challenges, the demand side management (DSM) is
increasingly exploited by smart grid operators to main-
tain the demand-supply equilibrium taking advantage of
the demand flexibility. DSM brings many solutions for
consumers such as energy saving through the reduction
of the electricity consumption and best use of electric
appliances. Recent advances in information and com-
munication technologies offer the opportunity for ad-
vanced DSM solutions, e.g., demand response, time of
use, spinning reserve, etc. In this study, we investigate
the demand response (DR) solutions to reduce the en-
ergy cost for consumers while ensuring their comfort.
The DR solutions consist of the short-term changes in
the power consumption that could be made in response
to the energy price variation. The dynamic pricing is
designed to incite consumers to participate in the DSM
by decreasing or increasing their power consumption. In
addition, DR solutions do not only consist in reducing
the power consumption but can modify the consumption
pattern. DR is enabled through communication infras-
tructures (Fadel et al. 2015), allowing to decrease energy
consumption during peak periods. It has been shown
that DR can solve some existing problems in traditional
power systems and enhance the reliability (Safamehr
and Rahimi-Kian 2015, Ma et al. 2013).
In conventional power systems, electricity prices do not
change to solve reliability problems, thus consumers are
not motivated to adjust their electricity consumption.
Smart grid technologies enable another pricing meth-
ods in restructured form. The prices are variable with
respect to the demand and operating conditions, which
involve the consumers participation in the power system
operation.
Various methodologies have been proposed for the en-
ergy management of the smart grid using demand
response. In (Al Zahr et al. 2017), advanced de-
mand response is proposed considering modular and
deferrable loads with the objective of reducing the
cost of consumed energy and peak consumed power.
In (Vivekananthan et al. 2014, Kaddah et al. 2014), di-
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rect load control (DLC) programs have been proposed.
DLC allows the energy provider to directly control
(switch on/off) the electric appliances of the consumers
with respect to their agreements (e.g., maximum num-
ber of interruptions, appropriate rewards, etc). Simply
shifting the power consumption of consumers at a peak
time to off-peak times may cause consumer’s discomfort.
To model the discomfort of consumers, the difference
between the desired load and the scheduled load is con-
sidered in (Deng et al. 2014).When shifting the power
consumption pattern, the difference between the desired
and scheduled time of loads can be considered to eval-
uate consumer’s discomfort. In (Eksin et al. 2015), a
game theoretic approach was used to solve the demand
response using the Bayesian Nash equilibrium with the
objective of minimizing the peak-to-average ratio. How-
ever the comfort level of consumers was not addressed.
In (Ning et al. 2017), a coordinated optimization is pro-
posed where the concept of demand response potential
(DRP) was introduced. However, the approach did not
verify the consumer’s comfort with concrete result.
Most of the aforementioned studies focus on the reduc-
tion of the energy cost and peak load to solve the energy
management problem and do not sufficiently consider
consumer behavior. In particular, the comfort level of
consumers was not considered simultaneously with the
energy cost in the demand side studies. Even when
jointly considered with the energy cost like in (Yang
et al. 2013, Kim et al. 2013), they are subsequently re-
ferred as a total cost. Such consideration may affects
the result of the energy management system and may
give a biased solution sometimes for the energy cost and
sometimes for consumers comfort.
In this respect, we propose a multiobjective demand
response game for the optimal scheduling of the elec-
tric appliances in smart homes. Non cooperative en-
ergy management game is designed to model the be-
havior of consumers. The proposed energy management
game incorporates the demand side in the supply man-
agement using the dynamic pricing policy to minimize
daily energy cost while reducing the discomfort level of
consumers with a multiobjective approach.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows:
• We propose a non cooperative energy management
game which guarantees the fairness among non-
cooperative consumers and apply the NSGA-II al-
gorithm to find the Nash equilibrium of the game
in accordance to the two conflicting objectives that
are energy cost and consumer’s comfort.
• We model the rational behavior of the consumers
that reduce their energy cost while seeking their
comfort.
• We address the concept of discomfort level of con-
sumers which is based on the difference between
the desired and scheduled time of the electric ap-
pliances.
This paper is organized as follows: Section gives the
smart grid model used in this paper. Section explains
the concept of game theory for the energy management
problem. Section gives the formulation of the proposed
energy management game. Section gives the numerical
results. Finally, Section concludes this paper.
SYSTEM MODEL
This section describes the smart grid system used in this
study and gives the energy management system (EMS)
architecture. Consider a smart distribution grid with
one electricity provider that supplies energy to a set
of n consumers, i.e., smart homes which are controlled
by a Multi-Agent System (MAS). Each smart home is
equipped with a smart meter that is connected to the
electric appliances via wire connection e.g., PLC (Power
Line Communication) or wireless connection, e.g., Zig-
Bee, etc. Furthermore, the smart meter integrates an
agent that has computational intelligence capabilities.
Each agent collects the planned tasks for the current
day and power consumption profiles of the electric appli-
ances from the smart meter. Consumers communicate
with the smart meter through wireless communication,
e.g., smart phones or tablets, to indicate the preferred
conditions of their electric appliances related to their
comfort, e.g., the preferred temperature in the rooms,
desired time to charge the electric vehicle, etc. Fig. 1
shows the architecture of the proposed EMS.
Figure 1: Distributed EMS Architecture.
In the proposed EMS, each consumer is character-
ized by its planned daily tasks TSj . Let TS =
{TS1, TS2, ..., TSk} be the set of daily tasks to be ex-
ecuted, each task can be characterized by two vec-
tors (Salinas et al. 2013):
Xj =
[
x1j , x
2
j , ..., x
t
j
]
(1)
Yj =
[
Pj Dj STj FTj STPj FTPj
]
(2)
where
• Xj is the power consumption profile of the electric
appliance that executes the task j where xtj is the
power consumption of task j at time t.
• Yj is the vector which characterizes the task j.
• Pj =
T∑
t=1
xtj is the energy demand of the task j where
the time horizon T = 24.
• Dj is the duration of the task j.
• [STj , FTj ] are the earliest start time and finish-
ing time to run the task j that define its admitted
interval of execution.
• [STPj , FTPj ] is the time preferred window of the
consumer to run the task j.
Pricing method
Let P tij is it the energy consumption of consumer i for
task j at time t. The total energy consumption of all
consumers (i = 1, ..., n) at time slot t is defined as fol-
lows:
lt =
n∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
P tij (3)
Consider Ctu(l
t) the cost function of utility grid at time
slot t. The quadratic cost function is usually used in
literature (Deng et al. 2014), i.e,
Ctu(l
t) = at.(lt)2 + bt.lt + ct (4)
where the quadratic costs coefficients (at, bt, ct) are time
varying. Real-time pricing is used in this study where
the price value is time varying. The price value depends
on time of use (TOU) and total energy consumption.
Based on this pricing model, the energy cost of con-
sumers at time slot t is defined as in (Deng et al. 2014)
by:
Ctc = c
t
r(l
t).
k∑
j=1
P tj (5)
where ctr(l
t) is the real-time price of energy. We assume
that the smart grid operator adopts adequate pricing
method that takes into consideration the energy con-
sumption in time and level. In this study, we con-
sider also consumers within distributed energy resources
(DERs) facility, i.e., prosumers that can generate en-
ergy. The revenue of the prosumer Rtp is calculated as
follows:
Rtp =
T∑
t=1
r.P tp (6)
where P tp is the power generated from the prosumer at
time t and r is the revenue coefficient.
Consumer discomfort level
To measure the discomfort of consumers caused by shift-
ing their consumption pattern, we introduce a discom-
fort cost as a quadratic function of the gap between the
desired and the scheduled time of the electric appliances.
We define a time shift parameter ∆j that models the gap
between the scheduled and preferred time of the task j.
Let tj denotes the start time of the task j. The time
shift parameter ∆j is calculated as follows:
∆j =

0, if tj ≥ STPj ∧ tj +Dj ≤ FTPj ,
STPj − tj, else if tj ≤ STPj ∧ tj +Dj ≤ FTPj ,
(tj +Dj)− FTPj, else if tj ≥ STPj ∧ tj +Dj ≥ FTPj ,
(7)
Here, for each task j, the concept of time shift can
be valid only in the admitted interval of execution
[STj , FTj ] of the task j. The discomfort cost can be
modeled with a quadratic cost function (Samadi et al.
2012) as follows:
C∆j =
k∑
j=1
α(∆j)
2 + β∆j + δ (8)
where α, β and δ are the quadratic cost coefficients.
Here, as more as the time shift parameter increases, i.e.,
the electric appliance is scheduled out of its preferred
time, the discomfort cost increases.
MATHEMATICAL GAME THEORY FORMU-
LATION
This section gives the mathematical game theory formu-
lation of the energy management problem involving the
MAS.
In the energy management problem, the consumers do
not collaborate, for example, when a smart meter shows
the real-time electricity price in the smart grid, the con-
sumer reduces or increases its electricity consumption
without asking neighbors whether they reduce their con-
sumption or not at a certain time. Game theory is able
to model the competitive behavior of the consumers.
In the proposed energy management architecture, each
consumer, i.e., agent is a player of the non-cooperative
game. The energy management game can be defined by
the following 3-tuple:
G = {N,S, J} (9)
where N is the set of players with |N | = n. S is the
strategy space of players where
S = S1 × S2 × ...× Sn (10)
J = S → R is the vector of cost functions of players
i = 1, 2, ..., n which is defined as
J(s) = [J1(s), J2(s), ..., Jn(s)] s ∈ S (11)
where the vector of strategies s = (s1, s2, ..., sn) ∈ S is
called a strategy profile. Let {ai} be the set of actions of
the player i. Each action ai represents the total energy
consumption of player i over the time slot t. For player
i, the set of the selected actions consists of the energy
consumption pattern for the time horizon T = 24, i.e.,
one day. The strategy si of the player i can be regarded
as a rule for choosing its actions. The cost function of
the player i is given by
Ji(s) = Ji{s∗i , s∗i } (12)
where the cost function Ji depends on the strategy
s∗i ∈ Si selected by the player i and on the strategy
profile s∗i of the other players. Solving the energy man-
agement game consists of finding the Nash Equilibrium
for each player in the non cooperative game. The vector
s∗ = (s∗1, s
∗
2, ..., s
∗
n) is a Nash equilibrium for the energy
management game G = {N,S, J} if the following con-
straint is valid:
∀i ∈ N, ∀si ∈ Si, Ji(s∗i , s∗i ) ≤ Ji(si, s∗i ) (13)
PROBLEM FORMULATION
This section describes the energy management game and
the considered game players.
Energy management game players
The proposed energy management game consists of
two types of players that are: consumer denoted by
(c-player) and prosumer denoted by (p-player). C-
player represents the flexible consumers that can adjust
their consumption pattern. P-player represents the con-
sumers within DERs facility. Each player has its own
objective functions, as illustrated in the following.
C-player
The c-player can adjust its consumption pattern
through managing its smart electric appliances. The
first objective of the c-player is to reduce the energy
cost as follows:
min J1 =
T∑
t=1
Ctc (14)
The second objective of the c-player is to minimize its
discomfort level by
min J2 =
k∑
j=1
α(∆j)
2 + β∆j + δ (15)
Hence, the cost function of the c-player is given by
Jc(s) = (J1, J2) (16)
P-player
The p-player can adjust its consumption pattern and
manage its DERs. The first objective of the p-player is
to minimize its energy cost and maximize its revenue as
follows:
min J3 =
T∑
t=1
Ctp −Rtp (17)
where Ctp, R
t
p are the energy cost and revenue of p-player
at time slot t, respectively.
The second objective of the p-player is to minimize its
discomfort level by
min J4 =
k∑
j=1
α(∆j)
2 + β∆j + δ (18)
Thus, the cost function of the p-player is given by
Jp(s) = (J3, J4) (19)
Constraints
The proposed energy management game is subject to
the following constraints.
Time constraints
Each task j of duration Dj must be executed exactly
once between its earliest start time STj and finishing
time FTj . The start time tj of task j satisfies the fol-
lowing constraint:
STj ≤ tj ≤ FTj −Dj (20)
Energy balance
The energy generated by the utility grid and p-player
must be equal to the total energy consumed by c-player
and p-player satisfying:
Etu + E
t
p − Etd = 0 (21)
where Etu is the energy produced by the utility grid,
Etp is the energy produced by the p-player and E
t
d is the
total energy demand of all consumers, i.e., c-players and
p-players.
Nash equilibrium
The existence of the Nash equilibrium is proved by the
following theorem (Nash 1951):
Theorem 1. Every game with a finite number of play-
ers that can choose from finitely number of strategies has
at least one Nash equilibrium.
In the proposed non cooperative game, each player is
assumed to be rational, i.e., the player aims to mini-
mize its cost function by considering the best strategy.
Therefore, each player chooses the load profile that rep-
resents its best strategy.
Theorem 2. The combination of best strategies and
their corresponding cost functions constitutes the domi-
nant strategy which is the Nash equilibrium for the en-
ergy management game (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991).
NSGA-II scheduling
NSGA-II algorithm is used to find the Nash equilibrium
of the energy management game. A detailed descrip-
tion of the algorithm can be found in Deb et al. (2002).
Each player, i.e., agent gets the information about time-
differentiated electricity price from the smart grid oper-
ator to adjust the scheduling of its daily tasks. After
that, the agent applies the NSGA-II algorithm to solve
the multiobjective optimization problem with the objec-
tive to minimize the daily energy cost and consumer’s
discomfort. Hence, the NSGA-II algorithm specifies the
best strategy of each player in accordance to the mini-
mization of two fitness functions. For the c-player, the
strategy is chosen by
s∗c−besti = arg min
[
Jc(s)
]
(22)
For the p-player, the strategy chosen by
s∗p−besti = arg min
[
Jp(s)
]
(23)
The NSGA-II scheduling solution gives the dominant
strategy for each player which is the best strategy.
The combination of these best strategies constitutes the
dominant strategy which is the Nash Equilibrium of the
energy management game (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991).
NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section illustrates the system under study and gives
the numerical results of the proposed multiobjective en-
ergy management game.
For testing the proposed method, the EMS is developed
in MATLAB software. The system under study consists
of a smart grid with |N | = 30 consumers. The system
includes several c-players and p-players. Each player
performs its daily tasks, at least 8 tasks selected ran-
domly from Table 1. To obtain the Nash equilibrium of
the energy management game, our proposed multiobjec-
tive formulation was submitted to NSGA-II algorithm.
In order to incentivize the consumer to run some of its
electrical appliance at particular time-slots of the day,
the smart grid operator uses time-variable tariff rates.
Fig. 2 summarizes the set of considered electricity appli-
ances and highlights the starting and finishing time of
these appliances that can be scheduled in the admitted
time window. The first subfigure shows the appliances
of a typical c-player and the second subfigure shows the
appliances of a typical p-player.
Table 1: Task’s characteristics.
Task
Power
(kW)/h
ST j
(hour)
FT j
(hour)
Duration
(hour)
Washing machine 1 6 24 2
Laptop 0.1 18 24 6
Desktop 0.3 18 24 3
Air
conditionner
1.5 10 19 1
Dish
Washer
1 7 19 3
Fridge 0.3 0 24 24
Electrical
Car
3.5 18 8 3
Boiler 0.8 15 22 2
Iron 1.2 10 22 1
Cooker
Microwave
1.7 6 9 1
Spin Dryer 2.9 13 18 1
Television 0.6 19 24 3
Cooker Oven 5 18 19 0.5
Cooker Hob 3 8 9 0.5
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(b) P-player.
Figure 2: Tasks scheduling.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed scheduling
solution, three scenarios are investigated. The first is
the reference scenario (‘Ref-sce’), where each task will
be executed at its preferred time interval and will not
be executed in early or later time. In the litterature,
such scenario is called the welfare maximization as in
(Li et al. 2011). The second is the cost effective scenario
(‘Cost-sce’) as in (Al Zahr et al. 2017), where the tasks
are executed with the objective to minimize the daily
energy cost without taking into account the discomfort
of consumers. The third scenario (‘Cost-discomfort-sce’)
refers to the proposed multiobjective scheduling solution
which consists of the minimization of the daily energy
cost and discomfort level of consumers.
Fig. 3 shows the total power consumption for a typ-
ical c-player and a typical p-player for the considered
scenarios, while Figs. 4 and 5 show the results of the
considered scenarios for all the consumers in terms of
energy cost and discomfort level.
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Figure 3: Power consumption.
It can be seen that p-player has more comfort than
c-player taking the advantage of its power generation,
which reduces its energy cost, such that, the prosumer
schedules its electric appliances during its preferred
time. On the other hand, c-player has less comfort due
to the absence of the power generation, such that, the
consumer schedules its electric appliances out of its pre-
ferred time.
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Figure 4: Daily energy cost.
As expected, ‘Ref-sce’ has the highest power consump-
tion. It is observed during peak hours from 18:00 to
20:00. ‘Ref-sce’ has also the highest daily energy cost of
electricity and with discomfort level equal to zero. A sig-
nificant decrease in the power consumption is observed
in the ‘Cost-sce’ from 18:00 to 20:00.
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Figure 5: Discomfort level.
It also achieves the lowest daily energy cost with a
reduction of about 40% compared with the ‘Ref-sce’.
However, discomfort level increased by at most 30%.
The ‘Cost-discomfort-sce’ has a low power consumption
where the reduction in the daily energy cost is about
37% compared with the ‘Ref-sce’. However, the daily
energy cost increased by at most 3% compared with the
‘Cost-sce’. The discomfort level is maintained in an ac-
ceptable level, which is increased by 20% compared with
the ‘Ref-sce’ and decreased about 10% compared with
the ‘Cost-sce’.
In summary, the proposed task scheduling strategy
achieved its main objective which is a tradeoff between
shifting the power consumption to time-slots where the
daily energy cost is cheaper and maintaining the discom-
fort of consumers in an acceptable level, thanks to the
proposed multiobjective game formulation which opti-
mizes these two conflicting objectives. In contrast with
the existing approaches which focus only on the energy
cost and impose a direct control on consumers appli-
ances ignoring their comfort, the proposed energy man-
agement game achieves a significant results in term of
cost as well as consumer’s discomfort.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, a non cooperative game theoretic ap-
proach has been proposed to implement a DR energy
management strategy for competitive residential con-
sumers to obtain a minimum daily energy cost and min-
imum discomfort level. The method presented has been
solved using NSGA-II algorithm. In the proposed game
theoretic approach, the consumers play a key role in
the energy management game through exploiting DERs
and scheduling their electric appliances locally, in con-
trast to centralized energy management systems that
use DLC approaches that directly control the loads and
impose load shedding to the consumers. The developed
energy management game can be used as a useful tool
for evaluating the electricity market and also for ana-
lyzing the strategic behavior of consumers in competi-
tive electricity markets. As a perspective, we will con-
sider additional choices of game theoretic approaches for
DSM and more comprehensive decision-making models
for consumers based on behavioral sciences.
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